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TOUCH DNA AND CHEMICAL ANALYSIS OF
SKIN TRACE EVIDENCE: PROTECTING PRIVACY
WHILE ADVANCING INVESTIGATIONS
Mary Graw Leary*
INTRODUCTION
Forensic science1 transforms criminal investigations by resolving previously
unsolvable cases and bringing an increased sense of justice to communities. This
application of scientific disciplines to legal questions aids investigators in solving
crimes. While many sciences can be utilized—such as physics (pattern evidence),
chemistry (toxicology), or biology (cause of death), to name a few—two aspects of
scientific advancement have played an outsized role in responding to crime. Trace
evidence analysis—specifically, deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) analysis—is an es-
sential component to an effective and accurate criminal justice system. DNA evi-
dence has emerged as a powerful tool to identify perpetrators of unspeakable crimes
and to exonerate innocent individuals accused of similarly heinous actions. Addi-
tionally, the advent of new technologies has offered investigators enhanced capabili-
ties to monitor suspects and to learn much more about them than previously imagined.2
Consequently, much legal scholarship has focused on the intrusive nature of these
mainly digital technologies and their implications on privacy.3
* Professor of Law, The Catholic University of America, Columbus School of Law.
Special thanks to Adam Bereston, Robbie Cain, and Steve Young for excellent research
support; to Julie Kendrick for endless drafts; to Adam Gershowitz for the vision for the Sym-
posium as well as the patience and priorities of a saint; and to the staff of the William &
Mary Bill of Rights Journal for their outstanding work.
1 The National Institute of Justice defines “forensic science” as “the application of sci-
ences such as physics, chemistry, biology, computer science and engineering to matters of
law.” Forensic Sciences, NAT’L INST. JUST., https://www.nij.gov/topics/forensics/Pages/wel
come.aspx [https://perma.cc/DE56-7D87] (last visited Dec. 4, 2017).
2 See Steven M. Bellovin et al., It’s Too Complicated: How the Internet Upends Katz, Smith,
and Electronic Surveillance Law, 30 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 1, 4–5 (2016) (tracing the origins of
police surveillance of telephone calls to IP-mediated communications, such as the Internet).
3 E.g., R. Craig Curtis et al., Using Technology the Founders Never Dreamed Of: Cell
Phones as Tracking Devices and the Fourth Amendment, 4 U. DENV. CRIM. L. REV. 61, 63
(2014) (criticizing how law enforcement uses electronic devices to track suspects and how the
current Fourth Amendment jurisprudence is inadequate); Jennifer Daskal, The Un-Territoriality
of Data, 125 YALE L.J. 326, 379 (2015) (discussing the overbroad surveillance powers that
law enforcement has when applying territoriality doctrine to electronic data and its effect
on privacy); Scott R. Peppet, Regulating the Internet of Things: First Steps Toward Man-
aging Discrimination, Privacy, Security, and Consent, 93 TEX. L. REV. 85, 129 (2014)
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While scholars debate these hardware and software advances, a different method
of examining traditional trace evidence has quietly grown somewhat unnoticed. The
emergence of so-called “touch-DNA” evidence and chemical analysis of skin traces
represents powerful, novel uses of trace evidence that have significant implications
for personal privacy.4 Furthermore, these abilities are developing within an outdated
DNA jurisprudence that is wholly inadequate to protect individual privacy and fa-
cilitate the legitimate government interest in accurately investigating crime. Just as
beeper and antiquated cell phone jurisprudence was an inadequate framework for
the issues arising from smartphones or GPS tracking, DNA jurisprudence has failed
to keep pace with modern uses of DNA. Traditional DNA jurisprudence rests on the
assumption that the alleles examined reveal only identification traits, and nothing else
about the person.5 But the new advancements of touch DNA and related technolo-
gies have the potential to reveal significantly more about the source of the DNA, un-
dermining the very basis of the law regarding DNA’s use in criminal investigation.
This Article addresses touch DNA, chemical analysis of skin traces, and the
implications for crime scene investigation, arguing that changes in how trace evi-
dence is analyzed require alterations in the law’s approach to its use. Part I discusses
the history of traditional DNA analysis. Part II examines the emergence of touch
DNA and related technologies and how they differ from traditional DNA analysis.
Part III outlines the specific risks created by the collection and storing of results
under the current outdated jurisprudence. Part IV focuses on specific risks to sus-
pects and victims of crime. Part V proposes a legal framework to address these po-
tentially powerful tools and their threat to privacy. In so doing, this Article proposes
drawing a distinction between the collection of DNA and cellular materials for
identification purposes and a subsequent examination of these materials for other
information about the source. The framework adopted by the Supreme Court for cell
phone examination in Riley v. California,6 required a more specific level of suspi-
cion to examine the contents of a cell phone than to obtain it incident to arrest.7 This
Article advocates utilizing this framework in the collection and examination of the
even more personal information contained within DNA and cellular evidence. Spe-
cifically, it distinguishes between collecting the evidence and routinely testing it for
(discussing how individualized inferences received from smartphone data create a legal prob-
lem for which privacy law is unprepared).
4 See generally Khalid Mahmud Lodhi et al., Generating Human DNA Profile(s) from
Cell Phones for Forensic Investigation, 6 J. FORENSIC RES. 288 (2015) (explaining that when
a person touches an object, epithelial cells are deposited and subsequently can be traced).
5 See United States v. Kincade, 379 F.3d 813, 818 (9th Cir. 2004) (recounting testimony
that the alleles examined “were purposely selected because they are not associated with any
known physical or medical characteristics” (citation omitted)).
6 134 S. Ct. 2473 (2014).
7 Id. at 2493 (holding that officers must generally secure a warrant before searching the
contents of a cell phone, even when the cell phone is seized incident to arrest).
2017] TOUCH DNA & CHEMICAL ANALYSIS 253
identity and the more invasive examination of the evidence for additional personal
information about the source. Before searching this deeply into this evidence for any
information beyond identification, the government must establish a higher level of
suspicion and obtain a warrant.
I. TRADITIONAL DNA ANALYSIS
The science of investigating crimes has evolved over centuries. As new tech-
nologies developed in various industries, law enforcement also adopted these tech-
niques. What once involved police surveillance by physically following a suspect
now involves cyber surveillance and drones. Contemporary disciplines, such as be-
havioral profiling,8 cyber investigations,9 and advanced interview techniques,10 were
unheard of in early police departments. Nowhere are these advancements more
apparent than in crime scene investigation.
In early law enforcement investigatory practices, the crime scene’s value was
predominantly in its visual corroboration of a victim’s testimony.11 A scene of dis-
array corroborated the claim of a scuffle, the presence of twine supported a claim of
restraint, and a broken window provided a clue regarding an intruder’s mode of en-
try into a home. However, placing an individual at the scene of a crime usually re-
quired eye witness testimony. In the case of a homicide, this was often impossible.
Even with a victim able to testify, difficulty in identifying a perpetrator, trauma,
or credibility battles between victims and defendants posed significant obstacles to
reaching the beyond a reasonable doubt standard of a criminal prosecution.
8 J. Amber Scherer & John P. Jarvis, Criminal Investigative Analysis: Practitioner Per-
spectives (Part One of Four), FBI L. ENFORCEMENT BULL. (June 10, 2014), https://leb.fbi
.gov/articles/featured-articles/criminal-investigative-analysis-practitioner-perspectives-part
-one-of-four [https://perma.cc/8L6S-C7NF] (stating that since the 1970s, the FBI has prac-
ticed behavioral profiling by analyzing crime scenes and providing behavioral and person-
ality traits of a possible offender).
9 Catherine D. Marcum et al., Policing Possession of Child Pornography Online: In-
vestigating the Training and Resources Dedicated to the Investigation of Cyber Crime, 12
INT’L J. POLICE SCI. & MGMT. 516, 517 (2010) (stating that some law enforcement agencies
are devoting additional resources to combat cyber crime).
10 Lori H. Colwell et al., The Training of Law Enforcement Officers in Detecting De-
ception: A Survey of Current Practices and Suggestions for Improving Accuracy, 9 POLICE
Q. 275, 276 (2006) (describing which interview techniques yield the most success).
11 See JOSEPH PETERSON ET AL., NAT’L INST. OF JUSTICE, THE ROLE AND IMPACT OF
FORENSIC EVIDENCE IN THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE PROCESS 1, 19, 23, 103, 123 (2010), https://
www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/231977.pdf [https://perma.cc/3A9T-GA7W] (stressing
the importance of evidence-gathering in corroborating information gathered from witnesses,
victims, or suspects). The authors cite a study finding prosecutors more likely to file charges if
a rape victim was physically injured, because “[t]he victim may be deemed more believable
if she has injuries that can corroborate her assertion that the intercourse was nonconsensual.”
Id. at 103.
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However, the evolution of trace evidence transformed criminal investigations.
Trace evidence can include traces collected from clothes, textiles, hair, or other fibers
that can inform investigators about who was present at a crime scene and provide
further information on what occurred.12 As law enforcement began to understand the
value in learning the source of trace evidence, investigators began to look for visual
signs of trace evidence, such as visible blood spattering, shoe prints, tire tracks, or
semen stains. While helpful, such evidence was not always determinative.13 This
could be due to the nature of the evidence—for example, a tire track is helpful but
not unique enough to demonstrate definitively the presence of a suspect’s vehicle;
the presence of type-O blood can narrow possible suspects, but it does not establish
the presence of a certain individual. The diminished quality of evidence also could
impact the strength of trace evidence as well. For example, a partial fingerprint or
a degraded sample of biological fluid may add little to the evidence in a given case.
However, the collection of evidence at crime scenes changed radically in the
1990s when Restriction Fragment Length Polymorphism (RFLP) DNA profiling
allowed for the testing of DNA on the molecular level.14 The earliest use of DNA
testing in the legal setting occurred in the 1980s.15 This presented a significant im-
provement in sensitivity for testing and was used primarily to link a suspect to the
scene of the crime.16 In its early years, this method still required at least a visible or
somewhat detectable sample size.
Within ten years, the technology advanced to Polymerase Chain Reaction (PCR)
based short tandem repeat (STR) testing.17 This system multiplies a single copy of
a DNA segment to allow for the analysis of the genetic makeup of a small sample.18
Current analysis makes it “possible to determine whether a biological tissue matches
a suspect with near certainty.”19 DNA is comprised of “coding” and “non-coding”
12 See Amina Bouslimani et al., Lifestyle Chemistries from Phones for Individual Pro-
filing, 113 PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCI. E7645, E7645 (2016).
13 See Joe Minor, Touch DNA: From the Crime Scene to the Crime Laboratory, FOREN-
SIC MAG. (Apr. 12, 2013, 6:27 AM), https://www.forensicmag.com/article/2013/04/touch
-dna-crime-scene-crime-laboratory [https://perma.cc/W6C3-FWTP].
14 Id.
15 EDWARD CONNORS ET AL., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, CONVICTED BY JURIES, EXONERATED
BY SCIENCE: CASE STUDIES IN THE USE OF DNA EVIDENCE TO ESTABLISH INNOCENCE AFTER
TRIAL 4 (1996) (stating that the first use of DNA in a criminal case was in 1987 in England
to corroborate a confession for two rape-murders); Edward J. Imwinkelried & D.H. Kaye, DNA
Typing: Emerging or Neglected Issues, 76 WASH. L. REV. 413, 413 n.1 (2001) (referring to
positive identification of a young immigrant boy seeking entrance into the United Kingdom);
see also Debra Cassens Moss, DNA—The New Fingerprints, 74 A.B.A. J. 66, 68 (1988).
16 See Jones v. Murray, 962 F.2d 302, 307 (4th Cir. 1992) (describing DNA as a “dra-
matic new tool”); Imwinkelried & Kaye, supra note 15, at 415.
17 Minor, supra note 13; see Andrews v. State, 533 So. 2d 841 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1988);
2 PAUL C. GIANNELLI ET AL., SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE § 18.05[a][1] (5th ed. 2012 & Supp. 2017).
18 See Lodhi et al., supra note 4.
19 Maryland v. King, 133 S. Ct. 1958, 1967 (2013) (citation omitted).
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regions.20 The loci examined are found on “junk DNA,” which are segments of the
DNA not known to code for any specific trait, but known to be different between
individuals.21 “Junk DNA” are the non-coding regions which contain valuable in-
formation about identity, but do not contain information regarding coding for other
genetic traits.22 This allows the development of a DNA profile without an examina-
tion into other genetic markers.23
As DNA analysis developed, it required a much smaller and, at times, barely
visible sample.24 It improved the ability of DNA evidence to even more precisely
determine the identity of the source of the DNA evidence.25 Once the DNA profile
of the source is generated, it is often compared with known sources to determine if
it matches the known person.26 The precision of the DNA test is so clear that “the
chance that two randomly selected individuals will share the same profile are infin-
itesimal—as are the chances that a person randomly selected from the population at
large will present the same DNA profile as that drawn from crime-scene evidence.”27
Thus, the sample is often compared for a match to the FBI’s Combined DNA Index
System (CODIS), which is an enormous collection of DNA records.28 Such a com-
parison can identify a prior felon as the source of crime scene DNA.29
DNA at a crime scene can be connected with an eventual defendant in several
ways. DNA samples are often collected from an individual either because of his sta-
tus as an arrestee,30 convicted felon,31 or as a suspect in an investigation. That profile
is compared with the profile of DNA left at a crime scene. If the genetic profiles
match, then it places the individual at the location of the crime. A typical example
involves the use of the CODIS. Most states allow for the collection of DNA sam-
ples from convicted offenders and certain arrestees or convicted persons.32 When a
20 Id. at 1966–67.
21 United States v. Kincade, 379 F.3d 813, 818 (9th Cir. 2004).
22 King, 133 S. Ct. at 1967.
23 See Kincade, 379 F.3d at 818.
24 Minor, supra note 13.
25 See generally JAY D. ARONSON, GENETIC WITNESS: SCIENCE, LAW, AND CONTRO-
VERSY IN THE MAKING OF DNA PROFILING 8–21 (2007).
26 See id. at 21–30.
27 Kincade, 379 F.3d at 819 (citation omitted).
28 Id.
29 See id. at 818–19; Simon A. Cole, Is the “Junk” DNA Designation Bunk?, 102 NW.
U. L. REV. COLLOQUY 54, 56 (2007). Notwithstanding this vast improvement, DNA con-
tinued to be no panacea because of its difficulty to obtain, the possibility of contamination,
or inability to identify a source of the DNA because the person is not in a known database.
30 See Maryland v. King, 133 S. Ct. 1958, 1965–66 (2013) (holding the cheek swab of
a defendant as part of routine booking procedures for serious offenses reasonable under the
Fourth Amendment).
31 See Kincade, 379 F.3d at 837–38 (holding that DNA testing of individuals convicted
of certain federal crimes does not violate the Fourth Amendment).
32 See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 943.325 (2017) (establishing a statewide database of DNA sam-
ples taken from anyone convicted of a felony, convicted of certain misdemeanors, or arrested
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biological sample is found at a crime scene, law enforcement will submit it to be
compared with samples within the National DNA Database (NDIS), administered
by CODIS.33 This system connects DNA laboratories on the federal, state, and local
levels in warehousing DNA samples from arrestees, convicted persons, and crime
scenes.34 If there is a match to a known source, CODIS confirms that match and
shares the information with law enforcement, thus linking the known individual
with a crime scene.35 If there is a match to an unknown source, then that provides
a lead to the investigators to determine whether the cases are connected by the same
perpetrator.36 In effect, the system “provide[s] a kind of genetic fingerprint, which
uniquely identifies an individual, but does not provide a basis for determining or
inferring anything else about the person.”37 There are twenty core loci used in the
NDIS,38 and as of July 2017, the system contained 12,965,666 offender profiles
and 2,794,000 arrestee profiles.39 “[L]aw enforcement, the defense bar, and the
courts have acknowledged DNA testing’s ‘unparalleled ability both to exonerate
the wrongly convicted and to identify the guilty. It has the potential to significantly
improve both the criminal justice system and police investigative practices.’”40
This use of DNA has been upheld by the Supreme Court based, in part, on the
belief that the loci examined are so-called “junk DNA.” As discussed supra, this
“DNA that differs from one individual to the next and thus can be used for pur-
poses of identification but which was ‘purposely selected because [it is] not associ-
ated with any known physical or medical characteristics’ and ‘do[es] not control or
influence the expression of any trait.’”41 That is to say that the loci used to create a
profile of the source individual only possess the ability to identify the source, similar
for a felony); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-266.4 (2017) (mandating that any person who is con-
victed of a certain crime or who is deemed not guilty by virtue of insanity and institution-
alized submit a sample of his DNA to be included in a statewide database); VA. CODE ANN.
§ 19.2-310.2:1 (2017) (allowing for DNA swabs of any person arrested for committing or at-
tempting to commit a violent felony); see also GIANNELLI ET AL., supra note 17, § 18.05[a][2].
33 See 42 U.S.C. § 14132 (2012); Frequently Asked Questions on CODIS and NDIS, FED.
BUREAU INVESTIGATION, https://www.fbi.gov/services/laboratory/biometric-analysis/codis
/codis-and-ndis-fact-sheet [https://perma.cc/TS42-6PNJ] (last visited Dec. 4, 2017) [herein-
after Frequently Asked].
34 See King, 133 S. Ct. at 1984 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
35 Id.
36 See Frequently Asked, supra note 33.
37 H.R. REP. NO. 106-900(I), at 27 (2000).
38 Frequently Asked, supra note 33.
39 CODIS-NDIS Statistics, FED. BUREAU INVESTIGATION, https://www.fbi.gov/services
/laboratory/biometric-analysis/codis/ndis-statistics [https://perma.cc/YMX5-3562] (last vis-
ited Dec. 4, 2017).
40 King, 133 S. Ct. at 1966 (quoting Dist. Attorney’s Office for the Third Judicial Dist.
v. Osborne, 557 U.S. 52, 55 (2009)).
41 United States v. Weikert, 504 F.3d 1, 3–4 (1st Cir. 2007) (alteration in original)
(quoting H.R. REP. NO. 106-900(I), at 27 (2000)).
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to a fingerprint.42 As will be discussed infra, this legal basis is no longer reality.43
Prior to discussing the legal justification for DNA, it is necessary to explain touch
DNA and related technologies and how they are distinct from traditional DNA.
II. TOUCH DNA AND RELATED TECHNOLOGIES
As discussed supra, DNA provided a revolutionary change in crime scene anal-
ysis, and this DNA testing continues to evolve.44 However, from its inception, it was
not perfect, and it required a certain minimal amount of material to create a profile.45
As technology developed, however, the field changed.46 When police needed a DNA
profile from a suspect, they no longer needed a search warrant supported by proba-
ble cause to obtain it from a suspect’s body.47 Rather, the emergence of so-called
“abandoned” DNA allowed for the creation of a profile without forcibly taking DNA
from an individual.48 “Abandoned DNA” refers to “any amount of human tissue ca-
pable of DNA analysis and separated from a targeted individual’s person inadver-
tently or involuntarily, but not by police coercion.”49 For example, DNA found on
shed skin cells left behind by individuals is “abandoned” DNA.50
A similar advancement occurred in retrieving DNA from objects or crime scenes
with the advancement of touch DNA. This technique was developed early in the
2000s and “allows analysis of just ‘seven or eight’ cells from the outermost layer of
skin.”51 Touch DNA is also known as epithelial DNA. It uses the same procedures
to examine bodily fluids as traditional DNA uses, but the testing is on these remain-
ing epithelial cells.52 When an individual touches an object, epithelial cells are often
left behind. The amount left behind is often less than 100 picograms and is also
called low copy DNA.53 This is evidence with “no visible staining that would likely
contain DNA resulting from the transfer of epithelial cells from the skin to an object.”54
42 See Cole, supra note 29, at 56.
43 See Weikert, 504 F.3d at 13.
44 See supra Part I. Other forms of DNA testing have continued to evolve, including
mDNA, Y-STR, LCN, etc.
45 See ARONSON, supra note 25, at 3–5.
46 See id.
47 See Elizabeth E. Joh, Reclaiming “Abandoned” DNA: The Fourth Amendment and
Genetic Privacy, 100 NW. U. L. REV. 857, 859 (2006).
48 See id.
49 Id.
50 See id. at 858.
51 See United States v. Thomas, 597 F. App’x 882, 884 (7th Cir. 2015) (citing What Is
Touch DNA?, SCI. AM. (Aug. 8, 2008), http://www.scientificamerican.com/article/experts
-touch-dna-jonbenet-ramsey/ [https://perma.cc/F8GN-PADM]).
52 Victoria Kawecki, Comment, Can’t Touch This? Making a Place for Touch DNA in
Post-Conviction DNA Testing Statutes, 62 CATH. U. L. REV. 821, 828–29 (2013).
53 Lodhi et al., supra note 4.
54 Minor, supra note 13 (emphasis removed).
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Because DNA testing has improved so much in sensitivity as well as in extraction and
analysis, this touch DNA is now possible, and DNA profiles can be obtained from
such small samples.55
Advances have also been made in the chemical analysis of traces of skin cells
left behind on objects. Examination of a very small amount of these epithelial cells
can give the examiner information far beyond identification, including information
about one’s personal life.56 This goes beyond genetic information to perhaps aid in
creating a composite sketch of possible physical features of a suspect. Such analysis
can provide “a complete chemical signature obtained through the chemical analysis
of a swab of the personal object [that] might reveal personal habits and enable in-
vestigators to develop a composite sketch of a person’s lifestyle.”57
While this would seem the natural progression of DNA and skin trace analysis,
it is important to understand the distinction between the abilities of touch DNA and
chemical analysis of skin traces and traditional DNA. They are twofold and raise
significant issues as to whether the legal framework surrounding traditional DNA
analysis is sufficient for this new form. First, touch DNA and related technologies
require a sample so small that it is often undetectable to the source person and is avail-
able from any item touched by a person.58 Second, the amount of information that
can be learned from these samples is much more intrusive into the private life of the
individual.59 These two features raise significant Fourth Amendment concerns.
A. Touch DNA Can Be Obtained from Minuscule Amounts of Trace Evidence
Touch DNA’s success is due to the increased sensitivity of testing techniques
that allow detection of molecular traces from the skin.60 Due to this development,
lower amounts of human DNA can be detected and, possibly, a full or partial STR
profile can be generated.61 “Due to its superb sensitivity, mass spectrometry (MS)
is a powerful tool widely used for forensic application by providing either molecular
or elemental analysis.”62
For example, researchers conducted an experiment where they swabbed cell
phones that had no prior preparation for touch DNA.63 One third of the phones
55 Lodhi et al., supra note 4.
56 See id.
57 Bouslimani et al., supra note 12, at E7645–46.
58 See, e.g., United States v. Quinones, 236 F. Supp. 3d 375, 377–78 (D.D.C. 2017).
59 See Bouslimani et al., supra note 12, at E7646 (highlighting the potential of providing
insights into the personal habits of an individual).
60 See E. Hanson et al., Specific and Sensitive mRNA Biomarkers for the Identification
of Skin in ‘Touch DNA’ Evidence, 6 FORENSIC SCI. INT’L: GENETICS 548, 555–57 (2012).
61 Lodhi et al., supra note 4.
62 Bouslimani et al., supra note 12, at E7645 (citations omitted).
63 Lodhi et al., supra note 4.
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produced the full DNA profile for the owner of the cell phone.64 However, that was
not the only result. The testing also produced a partial profile in 28% of the cell
phones, and another third of the phones had unknown profiles of others.65 What this
research suggests is that a DNA profile can be obtained from many objects simply
touched by an individual.66 This is a very different situation than the advent of tra-
ditional DNA analysis, which focused on bodily fluids left at a crime scene and
would likely be related to the crime being investigated.
B. Touch DNA and Related Technologies Reveal Much More Personal
Information
The concerns about the potential for DNA testing to lead to significant invasions
of privacy have existed for some time.67 This obviously stems from the concern that
one’s DNA contains massive amounts of genetic information unique to the individual.68
A recent version of this legal debate emerged in litigation concerning the DNA Analy-
sis Backlog Elimination Act.69 This Act allows for the Attorney General to create
grants for qualifying states to collect DNA samples from defendants convicted of
qualifying state offenses for inclusion in the FBI’s NDIS, in addition to the collec-
tion from federal offenders who are incarcerated, or who are on parole, probation, or
supervised release.70 Once the bodily fluid is collected, the FBI creates a DNA pro-
file from the sample for the NDIS.71 Courts upheld this Act, in part because testing
was limited to the so called “junk DNA” loci.72
64 Id.
65 Id.
66 See id.
67 See, e.g., United States v. Weikert, 504 F.3d 1, 16 (1st Cir. 2007); United States v.
Kincade, 379 F.3d 813, 843 (9th Cir. 2004) (Reinhardt, J., dissenting); Elizabeth R. Pike,
Securing Sequences: Ensuring Adequate Protections for Genetic Samples in the Age of Big
Data, 37 CARDOZO L. REV. 1977 (2016).
68 See Twila Brase, Opinion, Congress Has Exposed Patients’ DNA to Prying Eyes,
WALL ST. J., Aug. 29, 2017, at A15.
69 See 42 U.S.C. § 14135a (2012).
70 42 U.S.C. § 14135a(a)(1)–(2). The Justice for All Act of 2004 permitted the inclusion
of DNA from certain indicted people, and the DNA Fingerprint Act of 2006 permitted the
inclusion of arrestees’ DNA. See GIANNELLI ET AL., supra note 17, § 18.05[a][2]. CODIS
also includes samples from missing persons, crime scenes, and unidentified human remains.
Id.
71 See Frequently Asked, supra note 33.
72 Weikert, 504 F.3d at 12–14; Kincade, 379 F.3d at 849–51 (Reinhardt, J., dissenting).
This appears to be a relic of the courts’ analysis of fingerprints. The Supreme Court has upheld
the detention of an individual to obtain fingerprints, in part, on the ground that “[f]ingerprinting
involves none of the probing into an individual’s private life and thoughts that marks an in-
terrogation or search.” Davis v. Mississippi, 394 U.S. 721, 727 (1969).
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Although some judges recognize the potential for “junk DNA” to reveal infor-
mation about an individual’s “health, propensity for particular disease, race and
gender characteristics, and perhaps even propensity for certain conduct,”73 courts
have found that the overall program strikes the appropriate balance between the
government interest and the intrusion into privacy.74 Other judges have pointed out
the additional risk to the privacy rights of family members.75 They argue the heredi-
tary characteristics within the sample could be utilized against these members.76 The
Ninth Circuit discussed the distinction between DNA and fingerprint evidence—both
used for identification—by noting that “DNA stores and reveals massive amounts
of personal, private data . . . and the advance of science promises to make stored DNA
only more revealing in time.”77 While courts have recognized this concern as legit-
imate, they have generally not found the concern to outweigh the potential benefits
of collection and relatively minor privacy intrusion.78
Indeed, with touch DNA and related technologies, the day has come that the
government is poised to obtain DNA not only for identification, but also to peruse
much more information about sources of evidence. This could mean that much more
relevant evidence is collected about the case, but also that information about the
source individual’s health, personal habits, and life, which have no bearing on the
case, are collected as well.
As a positive development, the advancement of touch DNA and chemical anal-
ysis of trace skin cells can allow for the discovery of important information about
the crime being investigated.79 For example, from these epithelial cells, investigators
may be able to identify the presence of explosives, chemicals, or other relevant in-
formation that can assist in identifying or confirming the source of the sample or in
what behaviors the source of that evidence was engaged.80 Such evidence can com-
plement DNA or fingerprints and provide a more complete picture of an individual
or a “molecular lifestyle signature” to narrow down the suspects who are the source
of the evidence.81
However, of greater concern is the information that can be obtained about the
health or personal life of the source. Researchers in Great Britain examined the DNA
73 Kincade, 379 F.3d at 842 n.3 (Gould, J., concurring).
74 See, e.g., id. at 836–39 (majority opinion).
75 See id. at 849 & n.7 (Reinhardt, J., dissenting).
76 See id. at 850.
77 Id. at 842 n.3 (Gould, J., concurring).
78 The First Circuit noted that this legitimate concern “challenge[d] the core assumption
underlying junk DNA’s name—regions of DNA previously thought to be ‘junk DNA’ may
be genic after all.” United States v. Weikert, 504 F.3d 1, 13 (1st Cir. 2007) (quoting Kincade, 379
F.3d at 850 (Reinhardt, J., dissenting)).
79 Lodhi et al., supra note 4.
80 See Bouslimani et al., supra note 12, at E7645.
81 Id. at E7652.
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fingerprints collected by police and were able to confirm that one of the markers
thought to be “junk” actually contained information about a suspect’s susceptibility
to diabetes.82 This finding has alarmed some scientists as British police expand their
DNA collection programs and more is learned about genetic information.83 Other
research from the Netherlands has developed kits to analyze DNA left at crime scenes
that can predict the eye color of the suspects.84 Others have identified genetic vari-
ants for determining racial indicators and facial shaping that could assist in predict-
ing a person’s face from a DNA profile.85 This information is not limited to medical
information, but includes information regarding one’s personal life as well.86
Chemical analysis of trace skin poses further risks. Such analysis of epithelial
cells can reveal medical information about the source, including his susceptibility
to certain diseases,87 drug use, medications being taken (which may indicate medical
conditions), and the presence of caffeine, certain products, or illicit drugs.88
While some of this may appear to be minor information regarding hygiene, other
such information can be very private. Researchers have conducted experiments to
determine how much information they could learn about a person’s lifestyle by ana-
lyzing the chemical skin traces on their phones.89 Importantly, the goal of this research
was not to determine identity, but to determine lifestyle information regarding the
individual whose skin made contact with the object.90 The results of this research
included finding distinct lifestyle indicators even four months after the source en-
gaged in the activity.91 These included information regarding medications, hygiene
products, and diet.92 The medications included not just topical skin medication, but
also medications or drugs consumed and later secreted, including anti-depressants.93
82 David Concar, Fingerprint Fear, NEW SCIENTIST (May 2, 2001), https://www.new
scientist.com/article/dn694-fingerprint-fear/ [https://perma.cc/T5CA-57JM].
83 See id.
84 Police Can Identify Suspect’s Eye Colour from DNA, NEW SCIENTIST (Dec. 7, 2011),
https://www.newscientist.com/article/mg21228424-500-police-can-identify-suspects-eye
-colour-from-dna/ [https://perma.cc/ZZ6A-MQTL].
85 Peter Aldhous, Genetic Mugshot Recreates Face from Nothing but DNA, NEW SCI-
ENTIST (Mar. 20, 2014), https://www.newscientist.com/article/mg22129613-600-genetic-mug
shot-recreates-faces-from-nothing-but-dna/ [https://perma.cc/33T2-6LJM].
86 Valerie Ross, Forget Fingerprints: Law Enforcement DNA Databases Poised to
Expand, PBS (Jan. 2, 2014), https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/nova/next/body/dna-databases [https://
perma.cc/S2ZL-RZ22].
87 Concar, supra note 82.
88 Bouslimani et al., supra note 12, at E7648–50.
89 Id.
90 Id. at E7652.
91 Id. at E7646–47.
92 Id. The type of information learned included the presence of sunscreen, DEET, certain
foods, medicine, hair regrowth products, soap, cleaning products, and eye drops. Id. at E7650.
93 Id. at E7650–51.
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Such information could be helpful to investigators trying to identify an unknown
suspect as information about lifestyle, habits, and medication can “narrow[ ] the pool
of individuals to whom an object may have belonged.”94 However, such information
also can be used more nefariously to predict future behavior, learn about the per-
sonal life of a known individual, discover private medical information, and use that
information against the individual.95
C. The Advancement of Touch DNA and Chemical Interpretation of Skin Traces
Significantly Alters the Legal Landscape
This development poses more than just a typical advancement in science. This
advancement undermines the bedrock of the jurisprudential justification for allow-
ing the collection of DNA samples from suspects. As discussed in Part III, infra,
courts have allowed this collection because the DNA collected was so-called junk
DNA and, therefore, the intrusiveness of the collection was outweighed by the gov-
ernment interest in solving cases. For example, the First Circuit upheld the require-
ment that those convicted of certain crimes must provide a sample of DNA for CODIS
because the sample produced only a “kind of genetic fingerprint, which uniquely
identifies an individual, but does not provide a basis for determining or inferring any-
thing else about the person.”96 Moreover, the court agreed that if junk DNA was shown
to be more useful than it currently is, it would reconsider its conclusion.97 “[T]he
discovery of new uses for ‘junk DNA,’ would require a reevaluation of the reason-
ableness balance.”98 That day has arrived.
That day has come in two possible ways. First, there is a significant challenge to
the presumption that so-called junk DNA has no information other than identification.
Some argue that it is misleading to label these loci “junk,” as they are not devoid of
information beyond that used for identification.99 Some of the loci that were once
thought to be junk are now understood to be medically meaningful, as science has
evolved.100 On the other hand, some scholars have noted that this is not entirely clear.101
Regardless of whether the technology today can learn more than identifying infor-
mation from these loci, “[f]uture technological advances in DNA testing . . . may
94 Id. at E7645.
95 See id. at E7645–46.
96 United States v. Weikert, 504 F.3d 1, 4 (1st Cir. 2007) (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 106-
900(I), at 27 (2000)).
97 Id. at 14–15.
98 Id. at 14.
99 See, e.g., Cole, supra note 29, at 59.
100 Joh, supra note 47, at 870.
101 See, e.g., D.H. Kaye, Please, Let’s Bury the Junk: The CODIS Loci and the Revelation
of Private Information, 102 NW. U. L. REV. COLLOQUY 70, 70 (2007) (“There is no scientific
evidence that the specific DNA variations used to identify the sources of crime-scene DNA
perform any biological functions.”).
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empower the government to conduct wide-ranging ‘DNA dragnets’ that raise jus-
tifiable citations to George Orwell.”102
Secondly, the chemical interpretation of these epithelial cells can reveal the “per-
sonal lifestyle” of the source person.103 While it is not the exact same technology of
these specific loci, it is the chemical interpretation, on the molecular level, of only
a few epithelial cells.104 As such, this produces the same type of information that con-
cerned all the circuits that analyzed DNA collection.
III. THE CURRENT FOURTH AMENDMENT JURISPRUDENCE DOES NOT PROTECT
INDIVIDUAL PRIVACY RIGHTS IMPLICATED BY TOUCH DNA AND
RELATED TECHNOLOGIES
Given the personal nature of the information available through touch DNA and
chemical analysis, the privacy implications are immense. The Fourth Amendment
would seem to be an obvious source of protection from the government obtaining
this information without regulation.105 However, under the current state of the law,
that seems not to be the case.106 Like many areas of rapidly moving technological
and scientific advances, the Fourth Amendment’s protection against unreasonable
searches and seizures has failed to adapt. As such, under the current state of the law,
Fourth Amendment jurisprudence provides inadequate protection.
In order for the Fourth Amendment to be implicated, the government must en-
gage in a search or seizure.107 Only if this action is unreasonable can the government
be found to be acting unconstitutionally. In this context, there are three possible gov-
ernmental actions that could be considered a potentially unreasonable search or sei-
zure: collecting the DNA sample, extracting and testing the DNA, and retaining the
DNA information. Traditional DNA jurisprudence does not seem to offer protection
at these stages for touch DNA and related technologies.
A. Collecting the DNA Sample
When police are seeking to match two profiles, they often have samples from two
sources: the suspect and the crime scene.108 Obtaining a biological sample from a sus-
pect can either be done (1) voluntarily, (2) under the law via either a statute requir-
ing it, court order, or warrant, or now (3) from cells left behind by the individual.
102 Weikert, 504 F.3d at 15 (quoting Johnson v. Quander, 440 F.3d 490, 499 (D.C. Cir.
2006)).
103 Bouslimani et al., supra note 12, at E7645–46.
104 Id.
105 See U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
106 Joh, supra note 47, at 862–63.
107 Id. at 863.
108 However, other scenarios exist, including linking a victim’s DNA to the suspect’s per-
son or possessions. See, e.g., id. at 861.
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If done voluntarily, then no Fourth Amendment issue arises, as an individual can
voluntarily waive his or her Fourth Amendment rights and consent to a search.109
However, in cases in which the individual was compelled, the Supreme Court has
applied the Fourth Amendment search and seizure doctrine as a government intru-
sion into one’s physical body—the most basic example of a governmental search.110
Compelled collection of urine or breath has also been held to be a search.111 As dis-
cussed infra, the Supreme Court has also upheld statutes mandating DNA collection
from arrestees, asserting that the government interest in learning the actual identifi-
cation of the arrestee outweighs the intrusion placed on the suspect by a brief swab-
bing of the cheek.112
Maryland v. King113 is a significant decision in this area of the law.114 Unlike
some earlier technology cases, the Court was not unaware of the actual capabilities
of DNA evidence.115 Rather, by 2013, the power of DNA evidence was well known
to the Court.116 Some have critiqued the King Court for ignoring its knowledge of
the potential for DNA technologies.117 In cases involving equally rapid advances in
technology, the Court has wrestled with the privacy implications of an expansive and,
in some ways, ubiquitous technology.118
In King, the Court stood in a similar position and faced a choice. It could have
recognized the power of DNA analysis and treated the collection of DNA as more
invasive than that of other information about an individual, such as collection of an
109 E.g., Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 235 (1973) (noting that “consent” is
a “waiver” of Fourth Amendment protection).
110 Maryland v. King, 133 S. Ct. 1958, 1968–69 (2013) (forced sampling of arrestees is
a search, but reasonable); Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 767 (1966) (compulsory
blood test implicates the Fourth Amendment). For a discussion regarding obtaining a bi-
ological sample from a third party after a suspect has voluntarily provided a sample for, for
example, medical treatment, see Imwinkelried & Kaye, supra note 15, at 430–33. See infra
Part V for a discussion of Fourth Amendment jurisprudence.
111 Skinner v. Ry. Labor Execs.’ Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602 (1989). Although a search, the Court
considered the collection of such samples in certain circumstances under its “special needs”
doctrine analysis, which allows such collection, when reasonable, if the government has a
special need beyond criminal prosecution. Id. at 619.
112 See King, 133 S. Ct. at 1968, 1970.
113 133 S. Ct. 1958 (2013).
114 See id. at 1968 (stating that the case implicates an “expanding technology already in
widespread use throughout the Nation”).
115 See id. at 1966 (“[T]he utility of DNA identification in the criminal justice system is
already undisputed.”).
116 See id.
117 See, e.g., Tracey Maclin, Government Analysis of Shed DNA Is a Search Under the
Fourth Amendment, 48 TEX. TECH. L. REV. 287, 304, 306 (2015).
118 Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2489 (2014) (recognizing the vast capacity of a
smart phone to contain personal data and distinguishing its search from that of other objects
found on an arrestee’s person); United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 427 (2012) (Alito, J.,
concurring in the judgment).
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arrestee’s clothing, fingerprints, and photographs. Conversely, it could have treated
the DNA collection like any other collection of information from an arrestee. The
Court chose the latter, upholding the Maryland law that compels the collection of
DNA from all arrestees of certain offenses.119 In so doing, the Court unabashedly
treated DNA as a very accurate form of fingerprinting and allowed its collection as
a form of identification.120
This framing was met with vigorous opposition by Justice Scalia, writing in
dissent.121 He pointed out the weakness of this position given that the law at issue
did not itself allow for analysis of the DNA sample until after the suspect was
arraigned, thus belying the notion that the DNA was collected to ensure the valid
identification of an arrestee.122 Moreover, Justice Scalia noted that in King, as in
many other cases, the DNA was uploaded to CODIS many months later to determine
whether this suspect matched the DNA obtained in open cases.123 Scalia character-
ized this as investigating open crimes, not simply identifying individuals.124 Despite
these points, the majority opinion in King seems to undermine the argument that
compelled collection of DNA under certain broad regulations is an unreasonable
search or seizure.125
The results are similar when the evidence is recovered from a discarded object.126
This has been labeled shed DNA, but courts have treated it as abandoned DNA. In so
doing, courts have concluded no search occurs when shed DNA is collected.127
A search is a government examination of an area where there is a reasonable
expectation of privacy.128 More recently, the Supreme Court clarified its definition
of a search to still include the traditional definition of a governmental trespass into
a constitutionally protected area, if the government intent is to obtain information.129
Regardless of the definition, the law has consistently considered shed DNA as aban-
doned property.130 There is no reasonable expectation of privacy in abandoned
property.131 Furthermore, there is no invasion of the body or detention of the individ-
ual to obtain the sample. Because an individual leaves this DNA on objects, it is
119 See King, 133 S. Ct. at 1965–66.
120 See id. at 1972, 1976–77, 1980.
121 Id. at 1980 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
122 Id. at 1983.
123 Id. at 1984.
124 Id. at 1982–83.
125 See id. at 1980 (majority opinion).
126 Joh, supra note 47, at 865.
127 See Maclin, supra note 117, at 289 & n.12, 290 (outlining the “nearly unanimous” cases
rejecting Fourth Amendment challenges to such collections).
128 Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 360–61 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring).
129 See Florida v. Jardines, 133 S. Ct. 1409, 1414 (2013); United States v. Jones, 565 U.S.
400, 404 (2012).
130 Maclin, supra note 117, at 289 n.12.
131 California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35, 40–41 (1988).
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arguably abandoned, and the courts treat the government’s collection of it as not a
search for purposes of the Fourth Amendment.132 As such, there is neither an un-
reasonable Fourth Amendment search nor a seizure when the government collects
abandoned property.133
This idea that shed DNA is abandoned property is not without controversy.
Many scholars have challenged this notion.134 Professors Edward J. Imwinkelried
and D.H. Kaye argue that shed DNA is outside the abandonment doctrine because
there is little to no intent to abandon one’s DNA.135 It is, in fact, impossible to pre-
vent and, therefore, should not be treated as consciously abandoned.136 Professor
Tracey Maclin offers an equally strong critique.137
Although controversial, it could be argued that this approach made some doc-
trinal sense when the belief was that the shed DNA would reveal only the identity
of its source. If a suspect chose to discard a cigarette remnant on the street, it would
seem consistent with California v. Greenwood138 that police collection of that object
would raise no Fourth Amendment concerns.139 In addition to constitutionally
protected areas such as the home, the Fourth Amendment protects situations where
a reasonable expectation of privacy is demonstrated.140 No invasion of the body,
detention of the person, or government intrusion into a constitutionally protected
area occurs when police collect such an object. In fact, the very act of discarding
that object is an objective manifestation that the suspect has no expectation of pri-
vacy in it.141 Indeed, in light of the public’s contemporary knowledge of DNA and
its use in criminal investigations, one could argue that the individual, knowing the
item contains biological data and discarding it anyway, most clearly retains no
subjective or objective privacy interest in the object. This framework is compel-
ling when the reasonableness of the seizure is justified simply because it only re-
veals information regarding the identity of a perpetrator of a crime. The invasion
seems minimal in the collection of the object and in the information obtained. In-
deed, it is hard to imagine that a defendant could successfully argue that the govern-
ment’s extraction of fingerprints from a discarded firearm once held by the suspect
132 E.g., People v. Gallego, 117 Cal. Rptr. 3d 907, 911 (Cal. Ct. App. 2010) (discarded
cigarette remnant); Williamson v. State, 993 A.2d 626, 634–35 (Md. 2010) (abandoned
coffee cup).
133 Pike, supra note 67, at 2014.
134 E.g., Maclin, supra note 117, at 307–11; Imwinkelried & Kaye, supra note 15, at 437–38.
135 Imwinkelried & Kaye, supra note 15, at 436–40.
136 Id. at 437–38 (“The deposition of DNA in public places cannot be avoided unless one is
a hermit or is fanatical in using extraordinary containment measures.”); Maclin, supra note 117,
at 307–11.
137 Maclin, supra note 117, at 311–12.
138 486 U.S. 35 (1988).
139 See id. at 40–41.
140 See Florida v. Jardines, 133 S. Ct. 1409, 1414 (2013).
141 Greenwood, 486 U.S. at 40–41.
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is a search, when all it will determine is the true identity of an individual and noth-
ing more.
This analysis, however, loses some of its strength when one considers the
power of the information discarded and the lack of volition of the individual. That
cigarette remnant can reveal not only the identity of the individual; now, through
chemical skin analysis and touch DNA, it can reveal so much more. It can reveal
his health, drug use, medical condition, risk for disease, etc.142 By examining traces
of secreted medication it can reveal an individual’s psychological health as well.143
Indeed, chemical analysis can reveal information about the individual’s lifestyle
and demonstrate information about his or her activities.144 These are some of the
most personal of matters where one would seem to most certainly have an expec-
tation of privacy. Therefore, the basis for not considering the collection of such
evidence a search is eroded by the recognition of the amount of information avail-
able on the discarded item.
In addition to privacy expectations, this legal framework is more suspect when
one considers the lack of volition in the discarded DNA or trace cells themselves.
It is one thing to abandon an object and have the government obtain that object and
examine it for information. It seems quite another to simply exist—move through
life by walking, sitting, speaking on a telephone, holding a pen—and have the trail
of abandoned DNA collected. Not only does this scenario alone have a lack of any
volition, but it is impossible to prevent the shedding of these cells. With the ad-
vent of highly sensitive touch DNA and related technologies, it is actually impossi-
ble to prevent the leaving of seven or eight cells imperceptible to the eye.145 Yet,
these technologies transform these cells into gateways to personal information. If
the government can have unfettered access to this information, the Fourth Amend-
ment becomes a tiger with absolutely no teeth and individuals risk being stripped
of any sense of protection.
B. DNA Extraction and Testing
Another potential point in the process where the Fourth Amendment could of-
fer some protection is when the samples are extracted and tested. However, under
the current state of the law, this seems to have gained little broad traction.146 The
Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals has recognized that whether a person has a reason-
able expectation of privacy in his DNA is a “developing and unsettled area of the
142 See Bouslimani et al., supra note 12, at E7645.
143 See id. at E7648.
144 See id. at E7645.
145 See Imwinkelried & Kaye, supra note 15, at 436–38.
146 Contra Mario W. v. Kaipio, 281 P.3d 476, 482–83 (Ariz. 2012) (finding that seizure
of DNA sample of juvenile arrestee was authorized, but that the creation of a DNA profile
implicated privacy interests).
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law.”147 Acknowledging this ambiguity, however, the Fourth Circuit went on to
hold that the extraction of DNA from lawfully collected evidence when the defen-
dant is the target of an investigation is a search under the Fourth Amendment, and
that it is an unreasonable search when done without a warrant.148 However, several
other courts have rejected the Fourth Circuit’s analysis.149 Many have based their
analysis on United States v. Dionisio,150 which held the required disclosure of a
suspect’s voice is not a Fourth Amendment violation because obtaining a voice ex-
emplar did not involve probing into one’s personal life.151 Although the Court in
Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives’ Ass’n152 acknowledged that the chemical anal-
ysis of urine can reveal a host of private information and is a search, it also con-
cluded that such a search was reasonable.153
Although in the context of hardware, courts have accepted, to some degree, the
idea that two Fourth Amendment events take place—the seizure of the computer and
the later examination of it154—the same cannot be said of analysis of bodily fluids.155
In Schmerber v. California,156 for example, the Court’s analysis focused on the sei-
zure of the blood sample, and not on the subsequent testing of the blood for alcohol.157
Professors Kaye and Imwinkelried describe the state of the law as without restraint
once a sample is collected lawfully.158
That being said, many of the courts that have decided that the extraction and
testing of a DNA sample is not an unreasonable search have based their decision on
the lack of a reasonable expectation of privacy in one’s identity.159 Just as one has
no expectation of privacy in a fingerprint or physical characteristic, one also lacks
an expectation in the physical characteristic of one’s DNA, as it only discloses the
physical characteristic of identity.160
147 United States v. Davis, 690 F.3d 226, 240 (4th Cir. 2012).
148 Id. at 242–50.
149 Schmidt v. Stassi, 250 F. Supp. 3d 99, 106–07 (E.D. La. 2017) (noting that other courts
disagree with Davis); United States v. Hinton, 113 F. Supp. 3d 1277, 1290 (N.D. Ga. 2015);
Commonwealth v. Arzola, 26 N.E.3d 185, 193–94 (Mass. 2015).
150 410 U.S. 1 (1973).
151 Id. at 15.
152 489 U.S. 602 (1989).
153 Id. at 632–34.
154 COMPUT. CRIME & INTELLECTUAL PROP. SECTION, CRIMINAL DIV., U.S. DEP’T OF
JUSTICE, SEARCHING AND SEIZING COMPUTERS AND OBTAINING ELECTRONIC EVIDENCE IN
CRIMINAL INVESTIGATIONS 86 (3d ed. 2009), https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files
/criminal-ccips/legacy/2015/01/14/ssmanual2009.pdf [https://perma.cc/SF49-2478].
155 See Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 768 (1966).
156 384 U.S. 757 (1966).
157 Id. at 768.
158 Imwinkelried & Kaye, supra note 15, at 418.
159 See, e.g., Raynor v. State, 99 A.3d 753, 764 & n.9 (Md. 2014).
160 E.g., id. at 764 n.9 (“[N]o individual has a reasonable expectation of privacy in his or
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Because these technologies will expose far more than identity, testing may be
the point where privacy protections are implicated. The reason for many of these
rejections of Davis is rooted in the belief that no reasonable expectation of privacy
exists in the identification loci.161 However, touch DNA and related technologies
offer the opportunity to collect a few cells from an object and probe deeply into one’s
health and personal life. As such, although the Fourth Circuit in Davis is in the
minority, when applied to these new technologies, the existence of a Fourth Amend-
ment event is more apparent, and the law should reflect that distinction.
C. Retaining the DNA Information
Continuing along that line, some scholars have suggested that once the gov-
ernment has obtained biological evidence for a lawful purpose, the law allows its
use for any purpose.162 This has implications both for the testing of the sample, as
well as the next possible Fourth Amendment event—the preservation of the sam-
ple, in either a database or storage, for some potential future use. Here, again, the
current state of the law, although not uniform, suggests little constitutional pro-
tection. In United States v. Kriesel,163 the Ninth Circuit rejected the defendant’s
argument that it was unreasonable for the government to retain his DNA after he
completed probation.164 In so doing, the court found it reasonable because of the
importance of the efficiency of CODIS.165 In contrast, the Fourth Circuit found
that a crime victim retains a privacy interest in his DNA collected at a crime scene,
but that the admissibility of evidence against the victim, now turned defendant,
was not unreasonable.166 Most courts that have ruled upon the issue have found that
the retention and later matching of a lawfully obtained DNA profile is not a search.167
The First Circuit reserved for another day the question of whether it is constitu-
tional to retain a DNA profile of a defendant after he is no longer under supervised
release, finding this issue is far from resolved.168 In United States v. Weikert,169
the First Circuit noted such an ambiguous approach was due to the “rapid pace of
her identifying physical characteristics.”); see also Commonwealth v. Smith, 164 A.3d 1255
(Pa. Super. Ct. 2017).
161 See Raynor, 99 A.3d at 761.
162 Imwinkelried & Kaye, supra note 15, at 418.
163 720 F.3d 1137 (9th Cir. 2013).
164 Id. at 1146–47.
165 Id.
166 United States v. Davis, 690 F.3d 226, 256 (4th Cir. 2012).
167 E.g., Boroian v. Mueller, 616 F.3d 60, 67–68 (1st Cir. 2010); Wilson v. Collins, 517
F.3d 421, 428 (6th Cir. 2008); United States v. Hinton, 113 F. Supp. 3d 1277, 1290 (N.D.
Ga. 2015); Raynor v. State, 99 A.3d 753, 767–68 (Md. 2014).
168 See United States v. Weikert, 504 F.3d 1, 3 (1st Cir. 2007).
169 504 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2007).
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technological development in the area of DNA analysis.”170 Given the emergence
of touch DNA and related chemical analysis, this recognition appears well-advised.
That is not to say there are no protections. Many state laws that authorize the
collection of samples from arrestees or convicted felons limit their storage.171 For
example, the Maryland statute at issue in King specifically allowed the collection
of the evidence at arrest, but limited the testing and retention of it.172
However, given the substantial privacy implications of touch DNA and related
technologies, this reliance on state law is insufficient.173 First, this does nothing with
regard to evidence obtained at a crime scene. Arguably, nor should it. It is essential
in crime investigation to preserve and analyze evidence, and no regulation limiting
this activity seems advisable. Such recovered evidence has led to the conviction of
violent criminals as well as the exoneration of wrongly accused persons.174 Samples
initially retrieved and found unhelpful have been able to resolve cases after the de-
velopment of more sensitive testing.175 Such advances have exonerated hundreds of
wrongly convicted people.176 That being said, however, the advent of touch DNA
and related technologies implicates much more than obtaining information regarding
the identity of a person at a crime scene. It also means learning about their personal
lives and creating a personal profile for every person at that location, whether in-
volved in a crime or not.
Secondly, some of the advocates of this technology envision the creation of
massive databases of individuals, as well as the creation of personal profiles of in-
dividuals, based on the chemicals found in their epithelial cells on the molecular
level.177 These researchers seem to envision large-scale data collection, and some
170 Id. at 3.
171 See GIANNELLI ET AL., supra note 17, § 18.05[a][2].
172 MD. CODE ANN., PUB. SAFETY § 2-504(a) (West 2011); Maryland v. King, 133 S. Ct.
1958, 1967 (2013). Civil lawsuits have challenged the consensual storage of genetic data. See
Bearder v. State, 806 N.W.2d 766, 776 (Minn. 2011); Pike, supra note 67, at 1985–87 (refer-
ring to a similar Texas lawsuit, Complaint at 4–5, Beleno v. Tex. Dep’t of State Health
Servs., No. SA-09-CA-0188-FB (W.D. Tex. Mar. 12, 2009)).
173 See Pike, supra note 67, at 1979 (citing Albert E. Scherr, Genetic Privacy & the Fourth
Amendment: Unregulated Surreptitious DNA Harvesting, 47 GA. L. REV. 445, 484 (2013)).
174 See generally Jennie Vee Silk, Calling Out Maryland v. King: DNA, Cell Phones, and
the Fourth Amendment, 51 CRIM. L. BULL. 1212 (2015) (manuscript available at https://
papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2553606).
175 See generally SAMUEL R. GROSS & MICHAEL SHAFFER, EXONERATIONS IN THE UNITED
STATES, 1989–2012: REPORT BY THE NATIONAL REGISTRY OF EXONERATIONS (2012), https://
www.law.umich.edu/special/exoneration/Documents/exonerations_us_1989_2012_full_re
port.pdf [https://perma.cc/U5FP-M27Q].
176 Id. at 8.
177 See Bouslimani et al., supra note 12, at E7652; see also id. at E7651 (“One can imag-
ine . . . in the future to have a statistical approach and a confidence score for the type of life-
style when appropriate databases become available that connect each molecule and associate
such signatures with a lifestyle . . . .”).
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argue this is already occurring.178 Some scholars have advocated for a universal DNA
database.179 This seems akin to the Big Data currently collected on individuals re-
garding their digital activity.180 Much debate has occurred regarding the propriety
of this collection as well as the government’s ability to participate within appropri-
ate boundaries.181 Although King recognized this issue, it dismissed it, finding the
statute at issue in the case prohibited misuse of retained DNA samples.182
While the Court has not directly addressed the retention of records about indi-
viduals, Justice Sotomayor raised significant concerns about it in Jones.183 Writing
for only herself in concurrence, she sounded the alarm about not only the surveil-
lance of individuals through GPS monitoring, but the retention and sharing of that
information by the government without regulation.184 She noted that “the govern-
ment’s unrestrained power to assemble data that reveal private aspects of identity
is susceptible to abuse. . . . [M]aking available at a relatively low cost such a sub-
stantial quantum of intimate information about any person whom the government,
in its unfettered discretion, chooses to track [ ] may ‘alter the relationship between
citizen and government in a way that is inimical to democratic society.’”185 In what
has been widely regarded as the first endorsement of the mosaic theory by a Su-
preme Court Justice,186 this concurrence raises important issues and perhaps will
push the Court in the direction of addressing the increasing problem of the govern-
mental and corporate ability to collect and retain small pieces of data about indi-
viduals and use this data to gain deeply personal information about the individuals.
While the Court moved closer to understanding the power of collecting several dis-
tinct pieces of information about an individual and utilizing them to reconstruct one’s
life in Riley, as of now, the day of fully addressing that power has not been realized.187 
178 E.g., Pike, supra note 67, at 1982 (citing a 1999 RAND Corporation report asserting
that over 307 million tissue samples from over 178 million people have been collected).
179 See Arnold H. Loewy, A Proposal for the Universal Collection of DNA, 48 TEX. TECH
L. REV. 261, 261–62 (2015). For a discussion of the debate surrounding the creation of a
national database, see GIANNELLI ET AL., supra note 17, § 18.05[a][2], at 135 n.408.
180 See Mary Graw Leary, Katz on a Hot Tin Roof—Saving the Fourth Amendment from
Commercial Conditioning by Reviving Voluntariness in Disclosures to Third Parties, 50
AM. CRIM. L. REV. 341 (2013).
181 See, e.g., id.; Mary G. Leary, The Missed Opportunity of United States v. Jones:
Commercial Erosion of Fourth Amendment Protection in a Post–Google Earth World, 15
U. PA. J. CONST. L. 331 (2012); Pike, supra note 67, at 1983–84.
182 Maryland v. King, 133 S. Ct. 1958, 1967 (2013); see also MD. CODE ANN., PUB.
SAFETY § 2-505(b) (West 2011).
183 United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 416–18 (2012) (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
184 Id.
185 Id. at 416 (quoting United States v. Cuevas-Perez, 640 F.3d 272, 285 (7th Cir. 2011)
(Flaum, J., concurring)).
186 See Orin S. Kerr, The Mosaic Theory of the Fourth Amendment, 111 MICH. L. REV.
311, 313 (2012).
187 See Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2489 (2014). At the time of publication, the
Court has granted certiorari in Carpenter v. United States, which challenges the warrantless
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IV. THIS INCREASED USE OF TOUCH DNA AND RELATED TECHNOLOGIES RAISES
ADDITIONAL CONCERNS FOR BOTH SUSPECTS AND VICTIMS OF CRIME
As with nearly all investigative tools that implicate the Fourth Amendment, a ten-
sion exists. This is the inherent Fourth Amendment struggle between an individual’s
right to privacy and society’s need for security.188 For most of the technological
advances addressed by the Court—recording conversations, thermo-imaging, beep-
ers, dog sniffing, GPS tracking, etc.—the investigatory technique at issue served a
legitimate government interest.189 Phrased another way, these advances often rep-
resent powerful tools law enforcement can utilize to combat increasingly sophisti-
cated criminal and now terrorist elements. However, as these techniques become
more advanced, they become more intrusive, and references to George Orwell, once
thought to be hyperbolic, become more apt.
It is here that touch DNA and chemical interpretation of skin cells reside. The
ability to determine from any object at a crime scene clues about who was present
during a crime could transform criminal investigation. This is especially true in homi-
cides, terrorist attacks, or stranger sexual assaults, where the trail often goes cold with-
out witnesses able to identify perpetrators. With a “clearance rate” for homicides at
64%, one in three homicides goes unsolved.190 This technology could revive many
cold cases by providing clues about the lifestyle of the unknown perpetrators. Such
information could ultimately lead to a focus on a guilty criminal who would other-
wise escape punishment.
However, the power to learn personal and intimate details about the source of
the touch evidence is immense. King sidestepped this concern by asserting that all
DNA testing was examining junk DNA; it recognized more sensitive information
could be obtained, but concluded that state statutes could adequately limit such a
use.191 This narrow approach was vociferously rejected by Justice Scalia in dissent,
as well as by many scholars.192 This, combined with a threat that the government
collection of geolocation information through cell phones. United States v. Carpenter, 819
F.3d 880 (6th Cir. 2016), cert. granted, 137 S. Ct. 2211 (2017) (No. 16-402). This case could
implicate the mosaic theory and indicate whether the theory will be endorsed by the Court.
188 See Leary, supra note 181, at 362.
189 See, e.g., Jones, 565 U.S. at 402–05.
190 Martin Kaste, Open Cases: Why One-Third of Murders in America Go Unresolved,
NPR (Mar. 30, 2015, 5:04 AM), https://www.npr.org/2015/03/30/395069137/open-cases
-why-one-third-of-murders-in-america-go-unresolved; see also Thomas Hargrove, How
Many Unsolved Murders Are There? It’s Greater than the Population of Des Moines,
DENVER CHANNEL (Jan. 16, 2015, 10:25 AM), https://www.the denverchannel.com/decodedc
/how-many-unsolved-murders-are-there-its-greater-than-the-population-of-des-moines
[https://perma.cc/B34S-2C42] (noting that more than 211,000 homicides remain unsolved).
191 Maryland v. King, 133 S. Ct. 1958, 1979–80 (2013).
192 Silk, supra note 174 (manuscript at 4–5, 9–11).
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could collect such information and retain it indefinitely, raises even more privacy
concerns. This technology poses specific additional risks for suspects and crime
victims which must be addressed.
A. Concern for Potential Suspects: Reliability
This technology, while powerful, is not without risk. The technology of touch
DNA is so sensitive that it can include cells transferred from innocent people to crime
scenes.193 Such an event could lead to a false conviction. DNA is regarded as par-
ticularly reliable,194 and is the predominate method to overturn convictions.195 If
a suspect is wrongly convicted through touch DNA, correcting such a wrong and
proving his or her innocence may be an insurmountable task.
Research suggests the transfer of epithelial cells between people is a significant
concern. In one study, researchers had pairs of people shake hands for two minutes
and then later handle knives.196 In 85% of the cases, DNA was transferred from the
other person to the knife, and in 20% of the cases that DNA was identified as the
main or only DNA contributor.197 Thus, the sensitivity of this technology is a double-
edged sword. On the one hand, it opens new investigative doors. On the other, its
success is determined by the amount of cells present, which varies from one person
to another and from one circumstance to another.
In addition to transfer from people legitimately present at a crime scene, con-
tamination of evidence is also a greater problem with the increased sensitivity of
these investigative tools. Contamination of such evidence “is the unintentional in-
troduction of outside DNA into a crime scene or laboratory sample.”198 When this
occurs, the contaminating DNA can appear as background DNA, or as the single
or a major source in a mixture of DNA.199 Because CODIS contains DNA samples
of unknown origin from crime scenes, this could include DNA from innocent in-
dividuals who were at crime scenes before the crime.200
193 Michelle Malkin, Forensic Nightmare: The Perils of Touch DNA, NAT’L REV. (Jan. 4,
2017, 12:00 AM), https://www.nationalreview.com/article/443500/touch-dna-evidence-can
-lead-convictions-innocent-people [https://perma.cc/6Y2T-GUZS].
194 Id. However, questions have been raised about subjective analysis of mixed samples.
See PRESIDENT’S COUNCIL OF ADVISORS ON SCI. & TECH., EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT,
FORENSIC SCIENCE IN CRIMINAL COURTS: ENSURING SCIENTIFIC VALIDITY OF FEATURE-
COMPARISON METHODS 75–83 (2016).
195 See GROSS & SHAFFER, supra note 175, at 8.
196 Cynthia M. Cale, Forensic DNA Evidence Is Not Infallible, 526 NATURE 611 (2015).
197 Id.
198 Minor, supra note 13.
199 Id.
200 Adrienne N. Kitchen, Genetic Privacy and Latent Crime Scene DNA of Nonsuspects:
How the Law Can Protect an Individual’s Right to Genetic Privacy While Respecting the Gov-
ernment’s Important Interest in Combatting Crime, 52 CRIM. L. BULL. 371, 374, 381 (2016).
274 WILLIAM & MARY BILL OF RIGHTS JOURNAL [Vol. 26:251
With increased sensitivity, more DNA can be located at crime scenes and more
of it can be from innocent sources.201 For example, a case of transfer through an
EMT’s use of an oxygen monitor on two patients implicated the first patient in the
killing of the second patient, whom he had never met.202 Scientists have expressed
concern that heightened sensitivity of touch DNA can create false positives when
they identify the DNA of another.203
Courts have been somewhat ambiguous on the question of whether touch DNA
is generally accepted by the scientific community.204 While most have implied its
acceptance,205 some courts and statutes treat it differently than traditional DNA when
considering motions by defendants for retesting after conviction.206
Similar concerns about reliability exist with chemical analysis of theses molec-
ular samples. Researchers found that some distinct chemicals were present in the cells
four months after their use.207 These included evidence of the use of certain med-
ications, dietary items, and hygiene products.208 While not inaccurate, such findings
could be misleading. For example, the presence of a certain medication and self-tanning
products may point law enforcement in the direction of a person with a certain skin
tone who recently received a particular medication. However, if both of those data
points are outdated, police investigation may lead to the incorrect person, although
corroborated by physical evidence.
While this evidence can be a powerful law enforcement and exoneration tool,
its reliability is not that of traditional DNA. As such, it is proper to consider this
201  See Barbara Prainsack, Key Issues in DNA Profiling and Databasing: Implications for
Governance, in GENETIC SUSPECTS: GLOBAL GOVERNANCE OF FORENSIC DNA PROFILING
AND DATABASING 15, 19 tbl.2.1 (Richard Hindmarsh & Barbara Prainsack eds., 2010).
202 Malkin, supra note 193.
203 Douglas Starr, Forensics Gone Wrong: When DNA Snares the Innocent, SCIENCE
(Mar. 7, 2016, 10:00 AM), https://www.sciencemag.org/news/2016/03/forensics-gone-wrong
-when-dna-snares-innocent [http://perma.cc/4EN5-V28B]. At the same time, some exonera-
tion groups routinely seek touch DNA as a method of exonerations. Id.
204 E.g., State v. Nevius, No. 04-10-0985, 2012 WL 2361516, at *20 (N.J. Super. Ct. App.
Div. June 18, 2012) (noting no evidence that touch DNA is generally accepted); State v.
Carver, 725 S.E.2d 902, 908 (N.C. Ct. App. 2012) (Hunter, J., dissenting) (emphasizing that
the evidence available was touch DNA and questioning the majority’s reliance on it, given the
“relatively new” testing for it).
205 See, e.g., United States v. McCluskey, 954 F. Supp. 2d 1224, 1241–43 (D.N.M. 2013)
(allowing PCR/STR method of DNA analysis and calling it “generally reliable”); Bean v. State,
373 P.3d 372, 380 (Wyo. 2016) (parties stipulated to use touch DNA evidence); People v.
Lopez, No. B251815, 2015 WL 687294, at *5 (Cal. Ct. App. filed Feb. 18, 2015) (forensic sta-
tistical tool accepted); Swearingen v. State, 303 S.W.3d 728, 733 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010), cert.
denied, 565 U.S. 1241 (2012) (defendant’s motion for post-conviction DNA testing denied).
206 See KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 422.285(5)(e), (6)(e) (West 2017); Owens v. Common-
wealth, 512 S.W.3d 1, 9–10 (Ky. Ct. App. 2017).
207 Bouslimani et al., supra note 12, at E7647.
208 Id.
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when weighing Fourth Amendment concerns. The government interest in the evi-
dence to be obtained is weighed against the intrusion into the person’s privacy. If
the evidence is less reliable, then the government interest is weaker, and a subse-
quent intrusion without a warrant is less reasonable.
B. Concerns Also Exist for Crime Victims
A world in which law enforcement or even criminal defendants can utilize
touch DNA and related technologies poses possible invasions of privacy not only
for suspects, but for witnesses and victims as well. In forensic analysis, the goal is
not always to identify a suspect or connect him to the crime scene. Sometimes the
source of crime scene evidence is unknown and could belong to a victim, witness,
or perpetrator. Other times, the source is known to be that of the victim, and investi-
gators seek to determine if it is present on the defendant or his belongings. For ex-
ample, upon arrest, police may see blood spatter on a suspect’s clothing and seek to
have it tested to determine if it is that of the victim.
A victim may retain an expectation of privacy in her DNA even if her DNA
material is lawfully in possession of the police. While the law is limited and am-
biguous in the area, it is clear that a victim—whose status is not lessened as it is for
an arrestee, prisoner, or parolee—has a stronger argument due to that undiminished
status.209 Furthermore, there is a question of procedure. When a victim’s DNA is re-
tained to determine if a suspect’s possessions contain her DNA, the suspect can-
not assert the expectation of privacy in the victim’s DNA to prevent the testing.210
Moreover, if the defense independently tests such evidence, no state actor is search-
ing the DNA.
This scenario poses a threat to victims from both the government and others.211
The government can invade the privacy of victims to justify a failure to pursue
cases. Furthermore, as with all technologies, the use of touch DNA or cellular chem-
ical analysis cannot be contained to law enforcement or to criminal law. Such in-
formation could be sought to discredit victims by obtaining information about them not
usually available to defendants.
For example, this type of information may reveal medications which, in turn,
could also indicate the presence of certain medical conditions not otherwise relevant
or available to the parties. Such evidence contributes to improperly dismissing cases.
Additionally, it could be utilized as a source of improper discovery to conjure up ir-
relevant information about witnesses and then utilize it against them, either during
trial or pretrial to dissuade them from proceeding.
209 See United States v. Davis, 690 F.3d 226, 246 (4th Cir. 2012).
210 See, e.g., Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257, 261 (1960).
211 See Davis, 690 F.3d at 229, 256 (police seized a shooting victim’s clothing and years
later extracted and tested DNA to create a profile for the victim as a suspect in another case).
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Such use of evidence is not farfetched.212 Nowhere is this more apparent than
in sexual assault cases. These types of cases suffer a level of attrition unlike any other
type of case due to many factors.213 They are among the most under-reported forms
of victimization, due, in large part, to the expected treatment of victims by law
enforcement, the defendants, and the public airing of their cases.214 A common de-
fense in sexual assault cases is to attack the victim.215 The consequences of this are
felt not only in the actual experience of victims at trial, but also prior to trial, when
the message the defense often communicates to victims is that their personal life will
be unfairly displayed to the public; such a traumatic experience on the heels of a
sexual assault causes an end to the prosecution.
The idea that irrelevant biological evidence will be used against survivors of
sexual assault is not novel. Sexual assault kits collect potential evidence from vic-
tims’ bodies for sexual assault prosecutions. Yet, some research suggests that
police at times use sexual assault kit collection “to discourage rape reporting, inves-
tigation, and prosecution by using the forensic evidence collection process as a way
to intimidate victims, diminish the seriousness of the assault, and attack victims’
credibility as witnesses.”216 Similarly, it was recently discovered that tens of thou-
sands of rape kits—kits in which victims subjected themselves to some of the most
humiliating of procedures—were simply not tested.217 The Department of Justice
212 The Supreme Court invalidated a program in which hospitals obtained urine screens
from pregnant patients without their knowledge to determine if the mothers were using nar-
cotics during pregnancy. Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 532 U.S. 67 (2001). They would
then share the information with prosecutors, who utilized the results to criminally charge the
mothers. Id. at 73–74. See generally Mary Graw Leary, Affirmatively Replacing Rape
Culture with Consent Culture, 49 TEX. TECH. L. REV. 1 (2016).
213 Rose Corrigan, The New Trial By Ordeal: Rape Kits, Police Practices, and the Un-
intended Effects of Policy Innovation, 38 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 920, 923 (2013).
214 Megan A. Alderden & Sarah E. Ullman, Creating a More Complete and Current Pic-
ture: Examining Police and Prosecutor Decision-Making When Processing Sexual Assault
Cases, 18 VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN 525, 525 (2012) (“Research has found that the at-
trition rate continues to be high for sexual assault cases . . . .”); NAT’L SEXUAL VIOLENCE
RES. CTR., STATISTICS ABOUT SEXUAL VIOLENCE (2015), http://www.nsvrc.org/sites/default
/files/publications_nsvrc_factsheet_media-packet_statistics-about-sexual-violence_0.pdf
[https://perma.cc/YD5H-WCN8]; see also CALLIE MARIE RENNISON, BUREAU OF JUSTICE
STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, RAPE AND SEXUAL ASSAULT: REPORTING TO POLICE AND
MEDICAL ATTENTION, 1992–2000, at 2 (2002), https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/rsarp00.pdf
[https://perma.cc/L3UB-C7MP] (indicating that over half of all sexual assaults go unreported).
215 Alderden & Ullman, supra note 214, at 542.
216 Corrigan, supra note 213, at 921.
217 See NANCY RITTER, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, THE ROAD AHEAD: UNANALYZED EVIDENCE
IN SEXUAL ASSAULT CASES 1, 4–5 (2011), https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/233279.pdf
[https://perma.cc/2HRK-JS89] (acknowledging that there is no way to determine an exact
number, but noting that the number of untested sexual assault kits—at least 10,000 in Los
Angeles, 12,000 in Dallas, and 10,500 in Detroit—indicated the breadth of the problem).
2017] TOUCH DNA & CHEMICAL ANALYSIS 277
found that police did not submit completed rape kits in 18% of sexual assault cases
between 2002 and 2007.218 Human Rights Watch found 12,000 unprocessed kits
in Los Angeles.219 Other jurisdictions fail to test 75% of adult rape kits.220 These
kits potentially contain evidence of sexual assailants.221 The failure to test sexual
assault kits is more than just an oversight. Sexual assault cases by nature rely on
these kits to corroborate victims’ testimony and identify perpetrators.222 Yet, these
kits were simply collected and shelved, notwithstanding the fact that the presence
of a sexual assault kit is one of the determining factors for prosecutors’ decision to
prosecute cases.223
Even when collected, however, the kit and accompanying questions during the
exam can reveal information irrelevant to the rape investigation, such as the use of
birth control, presence of a sexually transmitted disease, or sexual history. This in-
formation is learned and, although irrelevant to the prosecution, has been used to
decide not to pursue cases or to discredit victims.224 For example, police have had
victims’ blood tested for drugs—without consent—to assess credibility.225 In Reedy
v. Evanson,226 police did just that, charging the victim with falsely reporting a crime
218 Id. at 1.
219 Testing Justice: The Rape Kit Backlog in Los Angeles City and County, HUM. RTS.
WATCH (Mar. 31, 2009), https://www.hrw.org/report/2009/03/31/testing-justice/rape-kit-back
log-los-angeles-city-and-county [https://perma.cc/E4Z6-2B7K]; accord RITTER, supra note
217, at 1, 3. There may seem to be some reasons that a sexual assault kit might not be sub-
mitted for testing, such as a victim’s announced unwillingness to proceed or a clear defense
of consent. However, more often these are inadequate. Such kits can be building blocks in
a case regardless of a victim’s views on the heels of a traumatic assault. Knowing that her
testimony is corroborated by physical evidence is important. Moreover, such kits can link a
perpetrator to multiple assaults. See Ken Armstrong & T. Christian Miller, An Unbelievable
Story of Rape, MARSHALL PROJECT (Mar. 12, 2009), https://www.themarshallproject.org
/2015/12/16/an-unbelievable-story-of-rape [https://perma.cc/V9VA-7F2F].
220 Corrigan, supra note 213, at 940.
221 See RITTER, supra note 217, at 1. Of the 1,595 kits tested in Detroit, 28% “revealed the
DNA identification of a potential suspect.” Sexual Assault Investigations: Untested Evidence
in Sexual Assault Cases, NAT’L INST. JUST., https://www.nij.gov/topics/law-enforcement
/investigations/sexual-assault/pages/untested-sexual-assault.aspx [https://perma.cc/YDW4
-U5MH] (last visited Dec. 4, 2017).
222 See Corrigan, supra note 213, at 940 (citing Erin Murphy, The New Forensics: Crim-
inal Justice, False Certainty, and the Second Generation of Scientific Evidence, 95 CALIF.
L. REV. 721 (2007)). Research suggests that many marginalized people’s sexual assault re-
ports are disregarded. Id.
223 Alderden & Ullman, supra note 214, at 533, 537–38.
224 Corrigan, supra note 213, at 941 (citing Linda E. Ledray, Forensic Medical Evidence:
The Contributions of the Sexual Assault Nurse Examiner (SANE), in RAPE INVESTIGATION
HANDBOOK 119 (John O. Savino & Brent E. Turvey eds., 2005)).
225 E.g., Reedy v. Evanson, 615 F.3d 197, 226–27 (3d Cir. 2010); Corrigan, supra note 213,
at 940–41.
226 615 F.3d 197 (3d Cir. 2010).
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only to drop charges when they learned she was raped by a serial rapist.227 The arrest
occurred even though “a reasonable jury could conclude that, at the time the arrest
was made, the facts and circumstances within [the detective’s] knowledge were not
sufficient ‘to warrant a prudent man in believing that [the suspect] had committed . . .
an offense.’”228
Under traditional DNA analysis, some courts and state statutes allow a defen-
dant who makes a sufficient showing to force a third party into testing.229 If expanded
to touch DNA, a defendant could order a victim to reveal highly personal informa-
tion through a sample.
To be clear, relevant evidence concerning a victim’s credibility should certainly
be a part of a criminal trial and defendants have an absolute right to be confronted
by their accusers. The concern regarding this evidence is in no way intended to sug-
gest that sexual assault suspects should be treated differently from others. Rather,
it merely recognizes the reality that this evidence will be misused to contribute to
the attrition of sexual assault cases.230 Consequently, as the use of touch DNA and
related technologies increase, similar legal protections must be put in place to pro-
tect victims from improperly inflicting trauma at trials with irrelevant personal
evidence now at the defense counsel’s and police’s disposal.
V. GET AHEAD OF TECHNOLOGY AND EXPAND RILEY V. CALIFORNIA
FRAMEWORK TO OTHER TECHNOLOGIES
The law often necessarily follows technological advances, rather than precedes
them. The Court has recognized the unwise temptation to intervene in burgeoning
technological investigative techniques before their use is settled.231 That being said,
in a number of technology based cases heard by the Court in the last decade, the
Court has offered some guidance.232 This framework provides a workable approach
to touch DNA and related technologies. Essential to this framework is avoiding creat-
ing a legal rule tied to technology. Such an approach will always fail because the
227 Id. at 202.
228 Id. at 223 (second alteration in original) (quoting Wright v. City of Phila., 409 F.3d
595, 602 (3d Cir. 2005)).
229 See, e.g., In re Jansen, 826 N.E.2d 186, 192 (Mass. 2005).
230 Heather Littleton et al., Impaired and Incapacitated Rape Victims: Assault Charac-
teristics and Post-Assault Experiences, 24 VIOLENCE & VICTIMS 439, 444–45 (2009) (re-
ferring to use of a stigma scale to assess feelings of stigma following sexual assault).
231 See Maryland v. King, 133 S. Ct. 1958, 1980–90 (2013) (Scalia, J., dissenting); City
of Ontario v. Quon, 560 U.S. 746, 768–69 (2010) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and con-
curring in the judgment); cf. Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 34–36 (2001) (noting that
it is proper for the Court to consider not only crude technology before it, but also more so-
phisticated technology in development).
232 Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473 (2014); United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400
(2012); Kyllo, 533 U.S. 27.
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technology will evolve before the ink is dry, thus making the rule obsolete.233 Rather,
the legal framework must be based on the type of information being sought. Because
it is based on the purpose of information being sought or examined—not on the
technology itself—it can guide investigations currently using these techniques. By
creating this framework now, parties can avoid establishing a normative practice for
law enforcement only to have the courts later find it unconstitutional, and thus dis-
rupt commonly accepted approaches.
The solution requires separate Fourth Amendment standards for the collection
and identification testing of the evidence and the more intrusive analysis of that evi-
dence for information other than identity. This framework, based on the analytical
framework of Riley v. California234 is consistent with United States v. Jones,235 Kyllo
v. United States,236 and Maryland v. King.237 Prior to Kyllo, as the Court saw advances
in technology, it generally did not expand Fourth Amendment rights.238 However,
more recently the Court has expanded Fourth Amendment protections.239 The result
has been characterized as inconsistent with the Court seemingly protecting privacy
in Riley but failing to do so in King.240 However, these cases can be somewhat recon-
ciled by distinguishing between obtaining identity information and obtaining more
intrusive information. It would leave the law regarding the reasonableness of col-
lecting touch DNA and epithelial cell samples unchanged. However, when the gov-
ernment seeks to examine the cells for something more than those loci utilized only
for identification, the government must establish a separate need to do so, thus pre-
venting a search of one’s personal information collateral to a permitted search and sei-
zure. While some courts have rejected the argument that testing DNA is a search, these
decisions were based on testing for identification.241 This question was largely un-
answered in King, as the majority opinion rested upon the assumption that DNA
testing only revealed identification and no other genetic traits.242 Justice Kennedy,
writing for the majority, further asserted that statutory protections prevented any fur-
ther invasion of privacy.243 This must be adjusted for the new technologies.
233 Leary, supra note 181, at 364.
234 134 S. Ct. 2473 (2014).
235 565 U.S. 400 (2012).
236 533 U.S. 27 (2001).
237 133 S. Ct. 1958 (2013).
238 See California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207 (1986) (helicopter); United States v. Karo, 468
U.S. 705 (1984) (beeper); Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967) (telephone).
239 See Riley, 134 S. Ct. 2473 (cell phones); Kyllo, 533 U.S. 27 (thermo-imaging); Jones,
565 U.S. 400 (GPS).
240 For an excellent discussion of the inconsistent approach toward privacy and a critique
of King, see Maclin, supra note 117, at 307–12.
241 See supra Part III.
242 133 S. Ct. at 1979.
243 Id. at 1979–80.
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A. A New Framework: Information Is Distinct from Objects
Riley v. California held that a search of a cell phone incident to arrest without
a warrant was unreasonable.244 Although an important holding, perhaps more im-
portant in today’s digital age is the Court’s categorization of different searches
conducted by law enforcement. Riley offers a new framework that distinguishes
between searching the physical phone and searching the more intangible informa-
tion it contains or to which it connects.245 In so doing, the Court adopted clear Fourth
Amendment principles to these different types of searches. The Court applied the
well-known balancing test to determine the reasonableness of a police action: “by
assessing, on the one hand, the degree to which it intrudes upon an individual’s
privacy and, on the other, the degree to which it is needed for the promotion of legit-
imate government interests.”246 The Court found that searching the physical phone
was reasonably done in the context of an arrest without a warrant.247 However the
search of the digital contents of the phone required a warrant.248 In drawing this
distinction, the Court recognized the quality of the privacy of the information—
i.e., the more private the information, the more protected it is.249 Finding that the
phone could contain or be a portal to highly private information in the form of in-
tangible digital data, the Court required a warrant.250
The basis of this distinction turned on three qualities of digital information,
which also apply to DNA and the chemicals within epithelial cells. These include
large storage capacity, the type of information contained in that storage, and the
pervasiveness of the information therein.251 Because these qualities are present in the
DNA and epithelial cells of all humans, the foundation for the Riley approach ap-
plies equally as well to these technologies.
Prior to Riley, the Supreme Court had allowed the search of any object found
on an arrestee’s person without a warrant.252 However, Riley recognized that cell
phones are different from other physical objects in that other objects, such as a wal-
let or purse, contain a finite amount of information.253 A search of a cell phone im-
poses a much greater intrusion on the privacy of the individual because it provides
access to an infinite amount of information.254 Therefore, this “immense storage
244 See 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2485 (2014).
245 Id. at 2485–88.
246 Id. at 2484 (quoting Wyoming v. Houghton, 526 U.S. 295, 300 (1999)).
247 Id. at 2485, 2494.
248 Id. at 2484–85.
249 See id.
250 Id.
251 See id. at 2489–90.
252 United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 224–37 (1973).
253 134 S. Ct. at 2488–89.
254 Id. at 2489.
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capacity” of the cell phone compelled the Court to draw a distinction between seiz-
ing the phone and searching the physical object of the phone (in the case of an ar-
restee, to ensure it is not dangerous) and searching the data within.255
The same is true of epithelial cells collected through touch DNA or chemical
analysis of trace skin evidence. Prior to these technologies, it was understood that
collection of biological evidence would only yield a DNA profile of “junk DNA”
which, in turn, would only provide identity information.256 This is a limited amount
of information and, thus, the privacy intrusion was considered minor. Balanced
against the government interest in identifying a perpetrator or ruling out other sus-
pects, such a collection of evidence and analysis was reasonable. Now, however, the
amount that can be learned through increased analysis of other loci as well as chem-
ical interpretation of skin traces is also immense and poses a significant privacy
intrusion.257 Distinguishing, therefore, the collection of such cells and the analysis
of them beyond identification of the DNA is supported by this concern. Indeed, the
Court recognized in the context of chemical analysis of bodily fluids that examina-
tions that reveal health facts are searches.258
The second basis for the Riley distinction is the type of information contained
in the data on the cell phone. By that, the Court focused on three qualitative aspects
of the data: that it “collects in one place many distinct types of information . . .
[and] allows even just one type of information to convey far more than previously
possible,” and that the data can date far back into the past.259 These three qualities
combined to allow “[t]he sum of an individual’s private life [to] be reconstructed.”260
The same can be said of the evidence at issue in this case. Indeed, advocates of this
chemical analysis assert its value is not only identification but that it can “develop
a lifestyle sketch of the person who has touched the object[ ].”261 By amassing in-
formation about a person’s genetic traits, medication, product use, and diet, much
can be pieced together to learn about this person’s most personal health status, life-
style, sexual orientation, habits, and practices. Therefore, these concerns in Riley
about piecing together disparate aspects of one’s life found in the data apply as
well to the information found in a chemical analysis and expansive genetic exam-
ination of the cells found through touch and transfer.262
255 See id.
256 See Nicholas v. Goord, 430 F.3d 652, 670 (2d. Cir. 2005).
257 Pike, supra note 67, at 1984–85 (“[I]t is possible to discern an individual’s entire genetic
sequence from a single cell contained in a stored biospecimen—and we do not yet know the
limits of what an individual’s genetic sequence can reveal.” (internal citations omitted)).
258 Skinner v. Ry. Labor Execs.’ Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602, 617–18 (1989).
259 Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2479.
260 Id. at 2489.
261 Bouslimani et al., supra note 12, at E7647.
262 See 134 S. Ct. at 2489.
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Indeed the DNA cases throughout the country echo this distinction. As dis-
cussed supra, although many courts have held that the testing, retention, or match-
ing of DNA profiles is not an unreasonable search without a warrant, they have
based these holdings on the fact that the defendant cannot establish a reasonable
expectation of privacy in an identifying characteristic.263 When defendants have raised
concern about access to personal data, courts have rejected such arguments as spec-
ulative.264 With the advent of these technologies, it is no longer speculative.
The Court’s final basis for the distinction between the object seized and the in-
formation therein, was the ubiquity of cell phones.265 Because most people possess
a cell phone with these characteristics, “[a]llowing the police to scrutinize such rec-
ords on a routine basis is quite different from allowing them to search a personal
item or two in the occasional case.”266 While the Court found relevant that 90% of
Americans possessed a cell phone, 100% of humanity possesses DNA filled epithe-
lial cells. Consequently, the concern that the government could routinely search this
data for personal information is valid.
Finally, Riley was concerned with the age of information.267 Because access to
a cell phone could reveal information years old, the Court noted the level of intru-
sion was significant.268 Similarly, this information is in some ways eternal. Obviously,
genetic traits have no time limit. But chemical analysis of skin trace evidence has
identified chemicals several months old.269 Therefore, the same concerns in Riley
are present here.
Although King held that DNA collected from an arrestee was not an unreason-
able search, this proposed solution is not inapposite to that finding.270 King limited
its holding to the collection and analysis of DNA solely for the purpose of identifi-
cation.271 This proposed solution is based on a different scenario in which the
government seeks to analyze the sample for far more than identification. Such would
be unreasonable as, unlike King, this search is a more substantial privacy invasion
and requires a more compelling government need for this private information and
likely a search warrant.
263 E.g., Raynor v. State, 99 A.3d 753 (Md. 2014); State v. Athan, 158 P.3d 27 (Wash.
2007).
264 E.g., Commonwealth v. Smith, No. 521 EDA 2015, 2017 WL 2351517, at *3 (Pa.
Super. Ct. May 31, 2017).
265 Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2490.
266 Id.
267 See id.
268 Id.
269 Bouslimani et al., supra note 12, at E7647.
270 See 133 S. Ct. 1958, 1965–66 (2013).
271 Professor Maclin argues that King is even more disturbing in shed DNA cases because
such targets are not arrestees and are unaware of the search, and because the purpose of the
search is to solve a crime, not just simply identification. Maclin, supra note 117, at 296–97.
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B. Distinguishing the Well-Accepted Traditional DNA Analysis from Touch DNA
Analysis for More Invasive Information and Chemical Interpretation of Skin Cells
These important characteristics of cell phones—specifically that the object it-
self allows access to a vast quantity of highly personal information (either because
it contains or is a portal to a cloud with such information), causes the Court to draw
an important distinction. It distinguished the object—the phone—from the infor-
mation within—the data. As such, it found reasonable and allowed the seizure of the
phones and examination of the physical aspects of the phone incident to arrest under
the current Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, but not a search of the data within.272
The collection of epithelial cells or the DNA itself is akin to the collection of the
physical object.
Similarly, the now rote DNA testing to develop a profile only for identifica-
tion is also allowable. As King illustrates, the ability to connect physical evidence
to an individual is essential in criminal investigation and exoneration.273 The gov-
ernment interest is significant and the intrusion on the individual is minimal.274
Although King acknowledged “the full potential” of DNA analysis was yet to be
known, it unreservedly underscored its unparalleled utility for identification.275 While
Kyllo saw the importance of anticipating and addressing the future potential of the
technology at issue, King took a decidedly different approach.276 These cases are in
tension, but the world has changed significantly even in the relatively short time
frame since 2001 when Kyllo was decided. Technological change is occurring at an
exponentially rapid pace. Arguably, in some technologies, the Court cannot wait to
decide a legal issue, but in others it can draw distinctions and develop workable
rules. It did so in Riley by drawing a distinction based, not on the technology itself,
but on the purpose of the search and depth of the government inquiry.277 By doing
so with touch DNA and related technologies, meaningful distinction can be made
between collecting DNA and other cells for the limited purpose of determining
272 The search incident to arrest doctrine is an exception to the warrant requirement.
United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 224 (1973). Here, the exception to the warrant
requirement would depend upon the situation. See id. at 224–26. If collecting touch evidence
from the crime scene, it would be abandoned. If collecting from an object known to have been
touched by a suspect it would also, albeit more controversially, be allowed as “shed DNA.”
If collected due to a person’s status as an arrestee, convict, parolee, or probationer, it would
be allowed under Maryland v. King. 133 S. Ct. 1958, 1969 (2013).
273 See 133 S. Ct. at 1972–73 (finding that the government does have a legitimate interest
in knowing whether an arrestee has committed another offense).
274 Id. at 1977.
275 See id. at 1966.
276 Compare Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 42 (2001) (Stevens, J., dissenting), with
King, 133 S. Ct. at 1966.
277 See 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2485, 2487 (2014).
284 WILLIAM & MARY BILL OF RIGHTS JOURNAL [Vol. 26:251
identification and analyzing that evidence for more personal information now ac-
cessible through genetic testing and chemical analysis of skin traces.
Thus applying the reasonableness balancing test, the King examination of DNA,
for identification only, is not demanding of a warrant.278 Such an examination can
only reveal a piece of information of significant importance to the government. In
the case of cell phones incident to arrest, the examination of the phone itself to de-
termine it is not a weapon and perhaps to allay concerns of any likelihood of evi-
dence destruction demanding further action under exigent circumstances similarly
demands no warrant.279
King consciously decided the issue of DNA collection from an arrestee not-
withstanding potential future technological advances.280 However, it also drew this
critical distinction between DNA analysis for identification and other purposes,
stating that “[i]f in the future police analyze samples to determine, for instance,
an arrestee’s predisposition for a particular disease or other hereditary factors not
relevant to identity, that case would present additional privacy concerns not present
here.”281 That is the case with touch DNA and chemical analysis of skin traces. Once
the examination exceeds that immediate purpose, then the government must demon-
strate a need for the further information. In Riley, that meant obtaining a warrant
with probable cause to search the data on the phone.282 In this context, it presumably
would mean a warrant to search for other genetic information or chemicals within
the skin traces.283
CONCLUSION
Touch DNA and chemical analysis of skin trace evidence will become power-
ful tools for investigations of criminal matters. As such, the government interest in
using the techniques is strong and, concomitantly, the risk to privacy is substan-
tial. Under the current state of the law, this evidence can be treated as abandoned
or allowed to be collected through other means and, once collected, the analysis of
it is possibly without limits. This is unsustainable. Suspects—and indeed any source
of this evidence—risk the government examining on the genetic and molecular level
such samples to learn deeply private information without justification. They further
risk abuse of the use of this information obtained without any Fourth Amendment
278 See 133 S. Ct. at 1979–80.
279 Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2485–88.
280 See 133 S. Ct. at 1979.
281 Id.
282 See 134 S. Ct. at 2485–86.
283 It should be noted that, as DNA testing for identification becomes more readily avail-
able to the citizenry, the use of technology by the government poses even fewer privacy con-
cerns. See Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 40 (2001).
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constraint. As the practice develops, this risk to privacy cannot be contained to sim-
ply criminal prosecution. Rather, defendants can seek this information to intimidate
witnesses and victims with the threatened (implied or explicit) exposure of highly
personal and private aspects of the individual’s life.
The framework now exists, however, to maximize the power of this approach
and minimize the risk to privacy. It comes from distinguishing between seizing and
searching the container of this information—the trace evidence—and the testing of
the evidence for personal matters beyond identification. Under this regime, law
enforcement could continue to obtain the trace evidence and test it for identification.
In other words, they could continue to treat such evidence as a limited source of
identification evidence such as a fingerprint. However, if the government seeks to
do more—to genetically and chemically examine the vast information contained
therein—it must obtain court approval. Such an approach adopted for cell phones
in Riley could apply to this emerging practice and balance the government interest
in the most accurate and efficient crime scene analysis against individuals interest
in protecting the intimate details of one’s life.
